INTRODUCTION
Florida is one of thirty-five states in the United States that executes its citizens.' Since 1972, when Florida's legislature reinstated the death penalty 2 (less than six months after the United States Supreme Court declared the capital punishment system as then administered unconstitutional 3 ), the state has averaged over thirty-eight death sentences a year and executed sixty-seven individuals. 4 Close to four hundred people are currently imprisoned on Florida's death row (12% of the nation's total). 5 These numbers make Florida the second most active death sentencing state, after Texas. 6 Florida leads the country in one other death penalty-related category: At least twenty-two people have been released from Florida's Thus, it was not surprising that the American Bar Association picked Florida as one of the eight death penalty states to be the focus of its Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project. That Project was created in 2001, in the wake of the ABA's 1997 call for a nationwide moratorium on executions. 9 The objective of the moratorium was to allow states time to identify and eliminate flaws in the death penalty process. 1 0 In aid of that goal, the ABA established the Project to collect data about the death penalty and encourage government leaders to undertake a detailed examination of capital punishment and enact any needed reforms. 11 The Project set up Assessment Teams in Florida and seven other states, with instructions to investigate twelve aspects of death penalty administration: police investigation procedures; the use of DNA evidence; crime laboratories and medical examiners; prosecutorial discretion; defense services; jury instructions; the judicial role; the direct appeal process; state post-conviction and federal habeas proceedings; clemency proceedings; the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities; and the treatment of people with mental illness and mental retardation. In this article, I will sketch out our findings in all twelve areas noted above, along with the recommendations the Assessment Team made with respect to each, all of which were endorsed unanimously by the eight Team members.
14 The three most significant concerns about the Florida death penalty process that evolved out of our research were the following: (1) mechanisms for assuring the quality and adequate compensation of counsel in capital cases are lacking; (2) the combination of poor jury instructions, Florida's unique practice of allowing the jury to recommend a sentence of death by a majority vote, and the fact that judges are elected (and thus arguably subject to popular pressure to impose the death penalty) undermines the legitimacy of death sentences that are imposed; and (3) the geographical and racial disparities associated with capital charging and death sentences call into question the fairness of the death penalty system. 5 The Team made recommendations in each of these areas. It also made recommendations concerning the clemency decision-making process and treatment of people with mental disabilities. 16 This article adds to these proposals several reform suggestions designed to deal with matters that the Team examined but did not make recommendations about: deficien-Elon Law Review cies in police investigation techniques, under-monitored crime labs, and attorney misconduct and nonfeasance.
All of the problems discussed in this article contribute to conviction of innocent people and to death sentences for people who are guilty but not deserving of the ultimate penalty. Thus, in addition to reforms in the specific areas identified above, the Assessment Team recommended the establishment of an independent commission scheme designed to investigate and evaluate claims of innocence. 17 This recommendation, discussed in the conclusion to this article, is meant to address deficiencies in all twelve areas to the extent they undermine the reliability of the legal process. A more subtle problem noted by the Assessment Team, also discussed in the conclusion, is the huge investment in financial and human resources required by the administration of the death penalty, to the probable detriment of the rest of the criminal justice system. 18 The discussion below is inevitably selective. The subjects emphasized here are not necessarily the findings that other members of the Assessment Team would have stressed. Further, the characterizations and analysis of the case law, statutes, procedures, and practices are mine alone; they should not to be attributed to any other member of the Team.
Police Investigation Procedures
The police can heavily influence death penalty cases in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, the manner in which they conduct interrogations and identification procedures can seriously taint the entire prosecution if certain procedures are not followed.
1 9 If police violate constitutional rights during the investigative stages, they may prevent conviction of a person who is clearly guilty, because the courts may feel compelled to exclude illegally obtained confessions or identifications even though they are reliable. 20 Of at least equal concern is the possibility that conduct that courts do not consider unconstitu-tional, or violations of the Constitution that are not discovered by the courts, will produce evidence that is unreliable and lead to the conviction of an innocent person.
With respect to interrogations, the most important issue is whether police techniques are so coercive that they might cajole a person into confessing to a crime he or she did not commit. Florida courts have excluded confessions that appear to have been involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. 21 But in several cases involving capital charges, the Florida judiciary has refused to exclude confessions made under conditions that empirical research suggests can be conducive to false statements.
For instance, one of the primary precipitants of such confessions is a lengthy interrogation during which the police convince the suspect that making incriminating statements is the only way to escape an intolerably stressful situation. 22 Yet in Chavez v. State, 2 3 a capital case, the Florida Supreme Court held that an interrogation that took place over a fifty-four-hour period was not unconstitutional because the defendant was provided with food, drink and cigarettes "at appropriate times," permitted to have one six-hour rest period, and was repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights. In another capital case, Nelson v. State, 24 the Court stated that, although the suspect was interrogated from late one night to 8:30 the next morning and then from 9 p.m. that day "for the majority of the night," his confession was voluntary because he had three breaks during the latter period, was offered cold drinks and coffee, and was permitted to use the restroom.
25 21 See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278, 290-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990 ) (finding confession involuntary because it was the product of enforced sleeplessness resulting from a sixteen-hour serial interrogation, during which the defendant was provided with no meaningful breaks and police asked him misleading questions, denied his requests to rest, refused to honor his Miranda rights, and used the defendant's history of blackouts to undermine his reliance on his own memory). 22 23 Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 749 (Fla. 2002) . 24 Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 524 (Fla. 2003) . 25 See also Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 311 (Fla. 1997 ) (describing a 6 hour interrogation in which the suspect was allowed to use the restroom and was given drinks); Roberts v. State, 164 So. 2d 817, 819-20 (Fla. 1964 ) (holding confession admissible even A second technique that research suggests is particularly likely to produce a false confession is a police pronouncement that the suspect will suffer a significant penalty unless a confession is forthcoming.
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Yet in one capital case the Florida Supreme Court refused to find involuntary a confession from a defendant who not only was repeatedly told he was guilty but was threatened with the "electric chair" before being promised that a confession would help him out. 27 Similarly, in another capital case the court held that the interrogators' intimation that the suspect would be in a worse position legally if he did not admit his involvement in the murder did not invalidate his confession. The Death Penalty in Florida "written waiver" that apparently consisted of the defendant circling statements on a form at the direction of the officer. 1 The confessions in these particular cases may have been accurate. But many confessions obtained by Florida police, using techniques similar to those just described, 2 have not been. Richard Leo and Richard
Ofshe, the preeminent researchers in this area, describe three false confession cases out of Florida. 33 Donald Shoup, a mentally retarded teenager charged with capital murder and robbery in Daytona Beach, confessed to the crime but was released after another person admitted he was responsible.
4 A second questionable confession came from Martin Salazar, whose murder charges were dismissed when it was discovered that the prosecutor and police withheld exculpatory fingerprint evidence. 5 In the third case, Tom Sawyer confessed to rape and murder, but the judge suppressed his confession because no evidence linked him to the crimes, his narrative fit poorly with the facts, and he could not produce any statements specific to the crime scene.
6 Three other cases are described by other sources. In the first, investigators from Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, and the Broward Sheriff's Office obtained a confession from a man who was later exonerated with DNA evidence. 7 In the second, Peter Dallas confessed to murder and implicated two friends after being threatened with the electric chair by Broward County police. Two other men were later convicted of the murder. 38 Finally, the murder conviction of Timothy Brown, a mentally retarded teenager, was reversed after a federal judge deemed his confession inadmissible because of threats from his interrogators. All of these cases involved capital charges. In most of them suspicions about the accuracy of the confession surfaced prior to trial and conviction. But the fact remains that the police relied on methods that produced a provably false or highly suspect confession. The police in these cases probably believed that the techniques they used were not likely to produce flawed results. Those beliefs need to change, and arguably Florida courts need to do more to change them.
A separate problem is the difficulty of finding out if police have used techniques that courts identify as impermissible. One method of dealing with this problem, recommended by commentators on all points of the political spectrum, is to videotape interrogations. 4 The Death Penalty in Florida practice, instead only permitting taping of "a summary/recap" of the interview.
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In interesting contrast to these relatively relaxed rules for interrogations in capital (and noncapital) cases are the very restrictive rules that apply to interrogation of the police themselves when they are suspected of an infraction or crime. Florida law states that in interrogations of law enforcement and corrections officers, officers may not use offensive language or threaten transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action. Further, interrogations must be limited to "reasonable periods" and "allow for such personal necessities and rest periods as are reasonably necessary," may not involve more than one interrogator, and must be taped in their entirety. 4 Apparently the police understand the ways in which interrogation can be coercive or produce misleading statements, and have lobbied to minimize those possibilities as much as possible when they are the focus of an investigation.
These revelations about interrogation law and practice in Florida should, by themselves, trigger significant concern about police investigation in death penalty cases. Even more troublesome, however, is Florida practice in connection with eyewitness identification, which is by far the most common cause of erroneous convictions. 46 To a jury, nothing is more persuasive than a witness who takes the stand and, under oath, points to the defendant saying, "That's the one." Yet misidentifications are, unfortunately, quite common. At least five of Florida's death row exonerees were convicted in part on the basis of faulty eyewitness testimony. Sometimes witnesses simply get it wrong all on their own, due to perception or memory problems. But on other occasions the police, perhaps unwittingly, help create inaccuracy by relying on identification procedures that are highly suggestive and likely to produce unreliable results. Research indicates that a host of police practices significantly increase the potential for misidentifications. These include: one-onone confrontations; lineups in which the "distractors" look like the suspect rather than the witness' pre-lineup description of the perpetrator; police suggestions or knowledge that the perpetrator is in the lineup; and failure to keep multiple eyewitnesses separate during the procedure. 48 Particularly troubling is laboratory research indicating that roughly 60% of eyewitnesses will say the perpetrator is present in lineups in which the researchers know the perpetrator is absent. 49 This finding has significant implications for real world identifications, where either police or self-induced pressure makes eyewitnesses particularly eager to help solve a case and look competent.
All of these problems can be easily avoided. For instance, whenever possible, police can use lineups or photo arrays instead of confrontations, avoid suggesting that a particular person in the lineup or array is a suspect, and always emphasize that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup or array. Numerous organizations have developed checklists that can aid police departments in carrying out reliabilityenhancing identification procedures. 52 and thus admit identifications taken under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances such as confrontations or one-picture photo arrays as long as there are other "indicia of reliability," which can consist solely of a witness' declaration that he or she is basing a subsequent, non-suggested identification on a memory "independent" of the tainted identification. 53 Unfortunately, memories are not so easily compartmentalized; our current "recollections" of a given incident are often heavily (and unconsciously) influenced by intervening events, such as a suggestive identification procedure. [M] emory of an event is subject to 'the forgetting curve,' which shows that memory originally declines quickly and then at a more gradual rate, which leave gaps in memory which witnesses often 'fill in' if questioned.").
instance, the Jacksonville police department rules instruct officers who are conducting photo identifications to include at least six photos, keep witnesses separate, and avoid influencing them, but also state that the distractor photos should look like the suspect (rather than the witness' description) and do not admonish the police to tell witnesses that the perpetrator's picture may be absent from the array. 55 Furthermore, the Jacksonville rules contain no provisions governing lineups.
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The Orlando police department's regulations, which do cover lineups as well as photo arrays, are otherwise very similar, and also tell officers that "language such as 'I think' or 'It looks like' should not appear in any written statement if the witness is certain of the identity." 5 7 All of the police regulations we obtained permitted one-on-one showups as long as they occur within a certain time of arrest (e.g., two hours in Orlando, four hours in Miami), regardless of whether less suggestive procedures are feasible. 5 8 Finally, while the Miami policy requires that the conducting officer videotape or at least photograph the procedure, the other policies do not, making post-procedure evaluation of police conduct difficult.
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In short, in Florida both the law and practice associated with police investigative procedures could be improved substantially if the goal is to avoid conviction of innocent individuals. Elimination of abusive interrogation techniques and adoption of the best identification procedures would cost very little, either in monetary terms or in terms of lost convictions of guilty people. In contrast, the gain in terms of greater confidence in the reliability of confessions and identifications would be substantial.
The Death Penalty in Florida powerful. As with police investigative techniques, it is crucial that such evidence be as reliable as possible.
DNA testing has revolutionized the criminal justice system. Because it can provide objective proof of guilt and innocence, it has also helped expose how interrogations, lineup procedures, prosecutorial misconduct and other aspects of the criminal justice system can lead to conviction of innocent people. Nationally, roughly 12% of those who have been released from death row were cleared because of DNA evidence. 6 But there is a flip side to such evidence. An improper DNA testing procedure or incompetent testimony about DNA evidence can also lead to improper convictions. 61 While at least two of Florida's exonerees were cleared based on DNA testing, 62 one other exoneree was convicted in part because of flawed DNA evidence, which relied on an untested matching technique and a possibly contaminated sample.
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Other types of scientific evidence can also lead to wrongful convictions. In the case of Robert Hayes, one of the two capital defendants in Florida eventually cleared by DNA, an FBI hair analyst testified at trial that hairs in the victim's mouth could not have been the white victim's, because they came from an African-American (the race of the defendant) .64 But later DNA testing revealed the hairs were the victim's. 65 Similarly, Anthony Ray Peek's first murder conviction was overturned because hair identification evidence was shown to be false.
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Medical examiners have also given inaccurate testimony. For instance, when she was the chief medical examiner in Pinellas and Pasco Counties, Joan Wood erroneously diagnosed shaken baby syndrome in two Mechanisms for avoiding these types of problems include statutory provisions establishing a legal process for obtaining post-conviction DNA testing, rules governing the proper maintenance of physical evidence, accreditation requirements for the personnel in crime laboratories and medical examiner offices, and strict guidelines on testing procedures and the types of conclusions that can be drawn from testing. 69 Florida's success at implementing these protections has been mixed.
Florida law does provide a procedure for both pre-trial and postconviction DNA testing, and even though petitioners must meet strict requirements to obtain an evidentiary hearing on post-conviction motions, 7 Florida courts are relatively generous in interpreting the rules and granting leaves to amend flawed petitions. 71 Less clear is the extent to which a successful motion provides a meaningful chance at relief. First, while Florida law requires that all physical evidence be maintained until at least sixty days after an individual is executed, 72 the courts have also held, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court holdings, 7 that destruction of physical evidence before the defense has an opportunity to examine it is not a due process violation unless the destruc-67 WILLIAM R. LEVESQUE [Vol. 1: 17
The Death Penalty in Florida tion is an intentional effort to prevent exoneration; 4 thus, as a practical matter, police have significant discretion with respect to preserving evidence. Second, although all of the state's crime labs and many of the local labs are accredited, none are equipped to perform mitochondrial or Y-STR testing, which is necessary for old, degraded evidence. 7 5 Third, as previously noted, despite the protections that exist, serious mistakes have been made, which suggests that greater diligence is needed in this area.
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The situation with respect to medical examiners is even more troubling. Florida does not require that medical examiners be accredited and, as of 2006 only four of the state's twenty-four offices had sought such accreditation.
77 Although a statewide commission oversees all medical examiners, accredited and nonaccredited, Joan Wood, the Pinellas and Pasco county examiner mentioned above who was involved in two misdiagnoses (and who was forced to retired after a misdiagnosis in still another case), was chair of that commission for six years, which calls into question the quality of its supervision. 7 8 An accreditation requirement and more rigorous monitoring of evidence maintenance and testing procedures would go a long way toward mini-mizing the most egregious scientific errors that have occurred in capital cases.
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Prosecutorial Professionalism
Under the Constitution, prosecutors are obligated to provide exculpatory information to the defense, and of course must also refrain from using perjured testimony (the "Brady rule")." 0 Florida's Rules of
Criminal Procedure also require the prosecution to disclose all of its witnesses as well as "a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial." 8 Finally, Florida's ethical code adds to the prosecutor's obligations by requiring production not only of exculpatory and relevant trial information but of any information that tends to "mitigate" the sentence. At least three of Florida's exonerees were convicted at trials in which the prosecutor knowingly withheld exculpatory information," and another was convicted at a trial during which the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony.
8 4 Several other exonerees were convicted on the basis of testimony later determined to be perjured. 5 Although in these latter cases no finding was made that the prosecution knew the testimony was false, in many of them the testimony was plagued with More often than not, however, prosecutorial misconduct is deemed harmless. In Guzman v. State, 95 the Court held that, although payment of $500 "reward" to a witness for her testimony was
"favorable" evidence that should have been disclosed by the prosecution, its disclosure would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Similarly, in Way v. State, 96 the Court found that photos that could have been used to impeach an expert witness of the state in a capital case were "favorable" but found that there was no reasonable probability the outcome of the case would have changed had they been disclosed. In the above-referenced study of capital and noncapital cases, misconduct by the prosecutor was found to be harmless 55% of the time. It must also be recognized that even if some types of "procedural" errors (e.g., commenting on the defendant's failure to take the stand; inappropriate closing statements) can be dismissed as harmless in terms of trial outcomes, they can still lead to inappropriate death sentences, which the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized are to be reserved for the worst murderers. 99 For instance, a comment about the defendant's failure to take the stand at trial may not appreciably influence a trial jury that already has sufficient evidence of guilt, but could well still prejudice the jury's sentencing deliberations. Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court, once again following the Supreme Court's lead, 1 "' repeatedly finds these types of procedural errors harmless, which sends prosecutors the message that they may be committed with impunity." 1 Prosecutorial professionalism can be enhanced by adopting two simple, inexpensive measures. First, if prosecutors appear to act unethically, they should be reported to the Bar by the relevant court and the Bar should take appropriate action. Reprimand, suspension or disbarment is likely to have much more of a deterrent effect on a prosecutor than a reversal or a finding that the prosecutor's error was harmless. Second, errors that are repeatedly committed should no longer be considered harmless. Florida courts can use their supervi- The Death Penalty in Florida been motivated by racial bias in deciding whom to charge with a capital offense.
1 6 This empirical information, combined with the fact that few prosecutor offices in Florida appear to have written policies governing the charging decision, led the Assessment Team to make the following explicit recommendation (the first of eleven to be reported in this article): "The State of Florida should develop statewide protocols for determining who may be charged with a capital crime, in an effort to standardize the charging decision." 10 7
Defense Services
Florida has a public defender system, meaning that most capital defendants are represented by salaried defense attorneys. 0 8 When the public defender office has a conflict (e.g., because it has represented or is representing a co-defendant, a victim, or a victim's relative), "conflict counsel" is appointed from a registry maintained by the clerk of court.
1 0 9 If there is a conviction in cases represented by a public defender, a different public defender from the appellate division brings the appeal. 110 In cases where conflict counsel litigated the trial, the same attorney brings the appeal unless the ground for conflict no longer exists, in which case the public defender appellate division usually takes over the case. [Florida] prosecutors sometimes motivated to seek a death sentence for reasons that reflect the racial configuration of the crime, but that they do so in a way that greatly reduces the possibilities for discovering evidence of discrimination and arbitrariness when only later stages of the judicial process are examined.").
107 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi. See Office of the Ariz. Attorney General, Capital Case Commission Final Report, 17 (2002) (recommending that all prosecutors involved in trying capital cases adopt written policies for identifying cases in which to seek the death penalty, including policies on "soliciting or accepting defense input before deciding to seek the death penalty."). 
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HeinOnline --1 Elon L. Rev. 37 2009 arrangement constituting an experiment by the state in an effort to save money).112 Any retrials or re-sentencings that result from the postconviction process are handled by the public defender or conflict counsel." 3 Two aspects of defense services in Florida particularly bothered the Assessment Team: qualification requirements for post-conviction counsel, and reimbursement schedules for private attorneys (i.e., conflict and registry attorneys). With respect to qualification requirements, lead trial counsel must have practiced criminal law for five years and served as lead counsel in at least nine "complex" trials, three or more of which involved a murder prosecution."
4 But post-conviction counsel need only three years of criminal practice experience, with only five felony jury trials under their belt." 5 These latter requirements fall well short of the basic qualifications recommended in the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which also require significant training in a number of specific areas (e.g., involving mental disability, scientific evidence), as well as retraining every two years.
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Attorney reimbursement was an even more significant concern. At the time the Assessment Team drafted its report, Florida law limited conflict trial counsel to a maximum of $3,500.117 In 2007, perhaps partly in response to the Assessment Team's recommendations (described below), the Legislature raised the maximum to $15,000."1 The increased cap is obviously a great improvement, but it still only equals the lowest cap of any death penalty state, most of which do not set maxima. 119 Although the Florida Supreme Court has held that the statutory cap may be exceeded in "extraordinary and unusual cases, 12 0 the new legislation states that the flat fee is generally to "comprise the full and complete compensation for private court-appointed counsel" 121 and that the extraordinary-and-unusual threshold is met only under Others who know Florida's death penalty process well have recently noted the same deficiencies. The federal courts have been unwilling to certify that Florida has established a mechanism for ensuring competent post-conviction counsel that meets the requirements of the 123 
Id. § (12)(d). 124 See id. § 27.711(4)
. 125 
See Spangenberg Group, Amended Time & Expense Analysis of Post-Conviction Capital Cases in Florida 16 (1998) (on file with the Review).
126 See FiA. STAT. § 27.
711(4) (h) (2008).
127 On several occasions, the CCRC has asserted that it could not provide effective assistance of counsel because of insufficient funding and, as it stated in one petition, because it was "overworked and forced to labor under severe time constraints." White v. (Fla. 2002) , where the Florida Supreme Court rejected claims that the registry system did not adequately compensate attorneys, noting that in previous cases it had held that courts could pay attorneys more than the cap under exceptional circumstances. The Florida legislature, concerned that the Olive decision would turn every death penalty case into an "exceptional" one, then instructed the Commission to take any attorney off the registry who would not agree to the maximum (which, as indicated above, is $84,000 from the end of appeal to the ultimate resolution of the case). See FLA. STAT. § 27.
711(8) (2008).
Several attorneys have attempted to obtain fees in excess of the local rates of compensation by claiming that the rates were "confiscatory" of their time. 33 which arguably made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel more difficult to win, the Florida Supreme Court granted relief on that ground in nine capital cases, and the Eleventh Circuit, which oversees Florida, awarded relief in fourteen out of forty-one such cases out of Florida. because of their incompetence and "deceit." 135 In another, the defendant's lead lawyer was a former prosecutor who had been suspended once and publicly reprimanded another time, while the two assistants in the case had a year's experience between them. 1 3 6 In a similar vein, in 1997 the Florida Supreme Court reversed a capital conviction and sentence because of the corrupt relationship between the judge and the attorney, who was appointed by the judge after the public defender's office was barred from the representation by a conflict. 1 3 7 The same year, Florida Supreme CourtJustice Harry Anstead expressed his frustration over the poor quality of representation at the trial level more generally:
The undisputed facts in this case present a blatant example of counsel's failure to investigate and prepare a penalty phase defense. Once again, we have a lawyer appointed who had absolutely no experience in capital cases ....
[I] n this case we have an inexperienced lawyer who has conceded that he was unprepared and, in his words "caught with [his] pants down," because he had erroneously assumed that the trial court would grant a lengthy continuance between the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the proceedings.
38
Post-conviction representation has also been very uneven. The mid-state CCRC office was dogged by charges of nepotism and unethical conduct at its inception.
1 9 And in one of the appeals filed by that office, the Florida Supreme Court heatedly criticized the lawyers for the poor quality of their work, pointing out that "the majority of the issues raised were conclusory in nature and made it very difficult and burdensome for this Court to conduct a meaningful review."
140
Even more troubling are accounts of the representation provided by the private "registry attorneys" in Florida's northern district. Lawyers working with that office have admitted they were unqualified, missed federal filing deadlines (apparently because they were unaware of them), and filed petitions containing no citations to the trial or ap- Government officials have conceded that only a fraction of these attorneys were willing to take cases to federal court, 143 and that supervising the scores of attorneys involved is not possible. 144 Referring to these private registry attorneys, Florida Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero stated in 2005 that cases they filed with the Court involved "the worst lawyering I've seen" and "the worst briefs that I have read." 1 4 5 He also stated, "I'm not sure we have enough quality lawyers out there that would be able to pick up the slack." 1 46
As with prosecutors, reporting defense attorneys to the Bar for unethical behavior is relatively rare. In State v. Murray, the Florida Supreme Court stated that "when there is 'overzealousness' or misconduct on the part of either the prosecutor or defense lawyer, it is proper for either trial or appellate courts to exercise their supervisory powers by registering their disapproval, or, in appropriate cases, referring the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary investigation." 147 However, in none of the fifteen capital cases the Assessment Team randomly selected in which a Florida court found a deficiency in the attorney's conduct did the opinion state that the lawyer should be referred to the Bar. In light of the foregoing observations about defense counsel in capital cases, the Assessment Team adopted the following three recommendations:
(1) The State of Florida should take steps to ensure that all conflict trial counsel in death penalty cases are properly compensated. Specifically, the State of Florida should (a) eliminate the statutory fee cap, thus giving judges the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis the appropriate amount of compensation, and (b) allow greater flexibility for obtaining interim payments for services; (2) Unlike the other recommendations made to this point in this article, these recommendations would require significant expenditures. But policymakers should also take into account the fact that good lawyering at the front-end can reduce costs connected with the post-conviction process. Especially when they are also assured adequate investigative and expert assistance, 1 50 good, well-paid trial lawyers not only are less likely to generate ineffective assistance of counsel claims but also are more likely to catch deficiencies in the state's investigative and charging process at a time when they can still be corrected or adjusted for, instead of years later when an expensive retrial or re-sentencing may be the only effective remedy. And, as the comments of the Florida Supreme Court suggest, qualified, well-paid post-conviction attorneys can enhance the efficiency of the litigation process through precise identification of issues and precedent. In the long run, money spent on defense attorneys is a good investment in capital cases from both a fiscal and fairness standpoint.
The Judicial Role During Trial and the Post-Conviction Process
This section combines three of the twelve areas the Assessment Team was asked to address: judicial independence; the direct appeal process; and the post-conviction process. The focus here will be judicial independence. As the discussion below reveals, a lack of such in-149 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at ix-x. 150 In Florida, trial attorneys are entitled to compensation for "reasonable and necessary expenses." See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304(1) (2008). These include court reporting and transcription fees, the costs of expert witnesses "summoned to appear," the costs of mental health professionals appointed to evaluate the defendant and "required in a court hearing," reasonable transportation and travel expenses, "reasonable library and electronic legal research services, other than a public law library," and "reasonable pretrial consultation fees and costs." See FLA. STAT. § § 29.006, 29.007 (2008). However, the statutes do not specifically provide funding for investigators. Post-conviction attorneys are entitled to one or more investigators, paid at $40/hour up to a maximum of $15,000, as well as miscellaneous expenses up to a maximum of $15,000. dependence can have a significant impact on all stages of the process, from trial and sentencing, through direct appeal and habeas review.
Trial judges in Florida are elected, and stand for re-election every six years. 151 Judges on the Florida Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal are appointed by the Governor from a list compiled by an independent commission, but are subject to retention elections at the next general election and every six years thereafter. 1 2 While in theory judges at all levels are insulated from political influence, the elective process may have subtle and not so subtle impacts on the outcomes of individual cases and death penalty jurisprudence more generally.
The Assessment Team found a number of accounts illustrating how election campaigns might influence judicial behavior. A Florida Supreme Court justice recalled that when he was responsible for assignments as a trial court judge,judges facing re-election asked him for assignments to criminal cases because it would help get their names in the press.' 53 In another campaign, a judicial candidate ran a TV ad in which he was endorsed by the father of a slain victim, as well as by the investigating sheriff, in a case likely to be tried in the candidate's judicial circuit. 154 Probably the best-known judicial campaign in Florida occurred in connection with the merit-retention election of Florida Supreme Court Justice Rosemary Barkett in 1992. In advertisements sponsored by the National Rifle Association, law enforcement groups, and related organizations, Barkett was repeatedly criticized for her opinions in capital cases, despite the fact that she voted with the Court's majority in those cases 91% of the time. 155 Two years earlier, then Chief Justice Leander Shaw faced opposition from anti-abortion activists and "law-and-order" groups upset with rulings of the Court, including those involving the death penalty.
The Death Penalty in Florida
Although apparently no appellate level judge has lost an election in Florida because of death penalty rulings, 157 these and similar criticisms of judges during election campaigns may have had less obvious effects. Professor Webster pointed out that both Barkett and Shaw spent $300,000 on their retention "campaigns," and that both received only about 60% of the vote, compared to much higher percentages for colleagues who were not challenged. 15 He also describes a survey of judges subject to periodic retention revealing that "three-fifths believe [d] judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial behavior."
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A more subtle interaction between the executive, legislative and judicial branches is described in the following passage:
In the early 1990s, the Florida Supreme Court, a highly visible institution, especially with respect to its death penalty jurisprudence, developed a meaningful system of comparative proportionality review that relied on a rich and transparent database with well reasoned opinions ....
[D]uring the 1990s, the court vacated 19% (32/170) of the death cases it reviewed on [the proportionality] issue ....
However, the practice was scaled back dramatically in 2000 after the Florida court came under severe political attack from the Governor and the Republican-controlled legislature for allegedly slowing unreasonably the pace of the executions in state. The 19% vacation rate on the proportionality issue in the 1990s dropped to 3% (3/97) between 2000 and 2003. The message from the experience of the Florida court is clear. Whatever a court's commitment to selective and consistent death sentencing may be, top-down, highly visible, and aggressive review practices may carry distinct political risks. 160 Other research confirms that, in the past decade, reversal rates in Florida capital cases continued to drop, 161 and use of procedural default rules to bar post-conviction claims has increased. The prospect of a re-election campaign might also interact with the Florida practice, almost unique among death penalty states, of allowing judges to override capital jury recommendations with respect to sentencing.
16 3 Consistent with the results of a nationwide survey finding that elections influence capital sentencing decisions, 164 Bright and Keenan's study of Florida death penalty cases found a statistically significant correlation between judicial overrides of life sentence recommendations and the occurrence of judicial elections.
16 5 These authors also describe three Florida judges who seemed particularly eager to override life sentence recommendations under circumstances that suggested prejudicial pro-death penalty bias. 166 Dieter describes a fourth Floridajudge who overrode a unanimous jury recommendation for life and, two decades later when the conviction was overturned, "offered to come back from his retired status to hear the case, despite the fact that he had made recent comments to the press about [the defendant's] 1483, 1487 (lth Cir. 1995) (describing Judge Stanley's statement to a clerk that he was changing the venue to another county that had "good, fair minded people here who would listen and consider the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-bitch" at which point the judge "would send Porter to the chair;" Stanley eventually overrode the jury's subsequent unanimous recommendation for a life sentence).
[Vol. 1: 17 None of this discussion is meant to suggest that the average Florida trial or appellate judge presiding over a capital case is swayed by extrinsic, non-legal factors. But it is meant to suggest that replacing judicial elections with a judicial appointment system would remove a significant source of pressure on judicial independence. Given the increasing amount of money spent on judicial campaigns, this proposed reform would probably also save money.
The Role of the Jury
Every one of the thirty-five death penalty states except Florida prohibits a death sentence unless the sentencing jury unanimously concludes either that at least one specified aggravator is present or that a death sentence is warranted, and twenty-seven of these states require both findings. 170 In order to recommend a death sentence in Florida, in contrast, only a mere majority of jurors (seven out of twelve) need agree on a death sentence and not even a majority is needed with respect to any particular aggravator.1 7 1 Apparently the rationale for this arrangement is that the trial judge is the ultimate decision-maker with respect to the death sentence; thus, jury unanimity is not required. Totally aside from whether this procedure violates the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Ring v. Arizona 1 73 that the jury, not the judge, must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact that supports a death sentence (an argument the Florida Supreme Court has rejected 74 ), Florida's decision-making framework undermines the reliability of the jury's death sentence recommendations in four ways. First, it permits such a recommendation when reasonable doubt is very likely to exist. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a nine to three verdict is sufficient for conviction, 17 5 it has never sanctioned a seven to five verdict, and probably would not do so given the uncertainty it represents. 176 Second, even unanimous death sentence recommendations in Florida are suspect because they can occur despite the possibility that no single aggravator garnered more than one vote (each juror voting for the death sentence may have settled on a different aggravator). The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed considerable ambivalence about verdicts that leave unclear whether the necessary number of jurors has agreed that every element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 77 Third, research based on interviews with jurors in Florida capital cases indicates that, since only a majority need agree on the recommendation, discussion and deliberation in these cases is often minimal. The Death Penalty in Florida seriously. As the study just mentioned stated: "IJiurors in hybrid states are significantly more likely than others to deny responsibility for the defendant's punishment, to misunderstand sentencing instructions, and to rush to judgment, all signs of the jury's lack of conscientiousness in its role as sentencer." i s Thus, the authors conclude, jurors make better decisions when they are made to understand that they are the ultimate arbiters of the defendants' fate, a conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court has at least obliquely recognized.
8 1 Florida's death penalty process, which tells capital sentencingjurors that their decision is only a recommendation and need only be agreed upon by a majority, 18 2 is uniquely designed to send precisely the opposite message. In part influenced by these considerations, the Florida Supreme Court has called on the Florida Legislature "to revisit Florida's death penalty statute to require some unanimity in the jury's recommendation."
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A separate problem with Florida's capital jury system-one that probably afflicts all death penalty states-is that laypeople have great difficulty following capital sentencing instructions. In one study involving interviews of individuals who had recently served on capital juries in Florida, over 49% of the participants did not understand that they could consider any evidence in mitigation, 1 4 and 48.7% were under the misimpression that they needed to find mitigating evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
18 5 The same study also found that over 36% of the jurors interviewed believed, incorrectly, that they were required to sentence the defendant to death if they found the defendant's conduct Some of these misunderstandings may result from ambiguity in the instructions; 188 others may be almost impossible to avoid.
189
In light of the foregoing observations, the Florida Death Penalty Assessment Team made the following three recommendations:
(1) The State of Florida should redraft its capital jury instructions with the objective of preventing common juror misconceptions that have been identified in the research literature [.] (2) The State of Florida should require that the jury's sentencing verdict in capital cases be unanimous and, when the sentencing verdict is a death sentence, that the jury reach unanimous agreement on at least one aggravating circumstance. (3) The State of Florida should give the jury final decision-making authority in capital sentencing proceedings, and thus should eliminate judicial override in cases where the jury recommends life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. As with most of the other recommendations made to this point, these recommendations are virtually cost-free, and they can only improve the fairness of the death penalty process. 186 Bowers & Foglia, supra note 184, at 72. Note that Bowers and Foglia use the term "heinous, vile or depraved" instead of "heinous, atrocious or cruel," which is the way Florida expresses this aggravator. FLA. STAT 
The Death Penalty in Florida Clemency
Every state grants some entity within the executive branch the authority to pardon crimes and commute sentences, including death sentences; in Florida, this role is assigned to the governor and a Board of Executive Clemency, consisting of the three members of the Cabinet, two of whom must agree with any gubernatorial decision to pardon. 191 In death penalty cases, the clemency process has traditionally been viewed as a final safeguard, designed to evaluate the fairness of the penalty in light of the circumstances of the case. 192 And, as the ABA has noted, "[t]he clemency process can only fulfill this critical function when the exercise of the clemency power is governed by fundamental principles ofjustice, fairness, and mercy, and not by political considerations.
93
Unfortunately, in Florida, politics probably have affected the exercise of the clemency power. Since the re-establishment of the death penalty in the 1970s, only six inmates on Florida's death row have received executive clemency, three because of doubts about their guilt, and three based on other considerations. 194 In raw numbers, this figure is average (Ohio has had eleven grants of clemency in death cases since 1976, Virginia and New Jersey eight, and Georgia seven, but fifteen states have had fewer than six 195 ). But the more important point for present purposes is that the last time a death sentence was commuted in Florida on humanitarian grounds was in 1983.196 That year is important as a political matter. As Bright and Keenan have noted, it was around that period that the death penalty became "a death on invidious racial grounds rather than through application of appropriate legal criteria.
Numerous studies of the Florida capital punishment process, spanning the past thirty-five years, have confirmed a correlation between the imposition of a death sentence and the race of the murder victim. 211 
Mental Disability
In recent years the U.S. Supreme Court has decided two important cases addressing the relevance of mental disability in death penalty cases. In Atkins v. Virginia, 224 it held that execution of people with mental retardation is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. And in Panetti v. Quarterman, 225 it rejected a shallow interpretation of the rule prohibiting execution of people whose mental disability renders them incapable of understanding the death penalty and the reason it is being imposed on them; as the Panetti majority stressed, the offender's understanding of why the penalty is being im-posed must be "rational" and not undermined by delusional thinking. 226 Lower courts have struggled with related issues, including the proper procedures to follow when a death row inmate who has mental disability wants to waive post-conviction appeals or is no longer able to assist his or her attorney with them. 227 As in the other settings discussed in this article, Florida law in this area is subject to criticism in several respects. Of course Florida follows Atkins, and thus bans execution of people with mental retardation.
22
But its definition of mental retardation is narrow. 229 Furthermore, the state does not prohibit execution of people who were seriously mentally ill at the time of their offense, despite the fact that such people are generally more impaired and less able to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions than people with mental retardation 20 (and certainly less so than juveniles, who are also exempt from death sentences after Roper v. Simmons 31 ).
Florida law is also unclear about three key issues that arise when mental disability manifests itself after conviction and sentence. First, Florida law provides that, when courts are determining the competency of a death row inmate who decides to waive a post-conviction claim, their focus should be on whether the inmate "understands the consequences" of the waiver, 2 2 thus leaving unsettled the validity of a waiver by a depressed inmate who can understand these consequences but does not care about them (and yet may feel very differently after the depression is treated). [T] he State of Florida should adopt a law or rule: (a) forbidding death sentences and executions with regard to everyone who, at the time of the offense, had significantly subaverage limitations in both their general intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury; (b) forbidding death sentences and executions with regard to everyone who, at the time of the offense, had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (i) to appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (ii) to exercise rational judgment in relation to their conduct, or (iii) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law; and (c)
providing that a death-row inmate is not 'competent' for execution where the inmate, due to a mental disorder or disability, has significantly impaired capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its imposition in the inmate's own case. It should further provide that when a finding of incompetence is made after challenges to the validity of the conviction and death sentence have been exhausted and execution has been scheduled, the death sentence will be reduced to life without the possibility of parole (or to a life sentence for those sentenced prior to the adoption of life without the Indiana, 24 1 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant who cannot be restored to competency to stand trial cannot be tried, but instead must either be released or civilly committed.
These various recommendations could have a noticeable impact on the administration of the death penalty. One observer estimated that "as many as fifty percent of Florida's death row inmates become intermittently insane [.] " 244 Some of these individuals were probably also seriously impaired at the time of the offense, presumably not significantly enough to be found insane under Florida's relatively strict insanity test but perhaps sufficiently so that they did not deserve the death penalty. 245 These facts suggest that under a normatively preferable, and arguably constitutionally required, standard at least some of the people on Florida's death row should never have been sentenced to death and others should have had their sentences commuted to life without parole.
CONCLUSION: INNOCENCE AND ECONOMICS
The description of Florida law and practice in this article raises grave doubts about whether all of the people who are currently on death row in Florida (not to mention the twenty-two who have been released from it) deserve it. Problems associated with police investigative techniques, scientific testing procedures, prosecutorial decisions during charging and trial, defense attorney qualifications and compensation, judicial and jury decision-making, jury instructions, the clemency process, and racial and disability bias can undermine the reliability of convictions in capital cases, the death sentences handed down in such cases, or both. The Florida Assessment Team believed that all of these matters deserve very serious consideration by policymakers.
The Assessment Team was particularly concerned about the possibility that people who do not commit capital murder will nonetheless 24 3 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972 (Fla. 2008) . Another concern in such cases is that, without a prohibition on execution of those who were seriously mentally ill at the time of the offense, the jury will improperly consider mental disability an aggravating circumstance, relying on the incorrect assumption that such people are abnormally dangerous. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 230, at 87-92 (for a detailed discussion of this point).
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HeinOnline --1 Elon L. Rev. 60 2009 The Death Penalty in lorida be convicted. Thus, as a final pair of recommendations, the Team concluded:
The State of Florida should create two independent commissions to: (a) establish the cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases and recommend changes to prevent future wrongful convictions in these cases; and (b) review claims of factual innocence in capital cases that, if sustained, would then be reviewed by a panel of judges.
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The creation of the first type of commission is important because understanding the reasons for mistakes in the death penalty processwhich have been numerous in Florida, as the long list of exonerees suggests-can help improve it.2 4 7
The second type of commission, which would supplement the current largely ineffectual post-conviction process, 24 has long existed in some European countries, 249 was recently established in North Carolina, and is being considered in at least twelve other states, 2 50 in large part because of the perception that procedural defaults and inadequate lawyering sometimes prevent claims of factual innocence from receiving full consideration.
Throughout, this article has also devoted attention to the cost of the recommendations made. Aside from the innocence commission proposals, the recommendation that racial disparities be studied, and the suggested increases in defense compensation, none of the recommendations made here would require the State of Florida to incur significant expense, and even the innocence and race projects would have only minimal fiscal impact. Further, because all of the proposed reforms should improve the reliability of the process, death sentences and the associated costs would be reduced. Only a few of these reforms have been considered since the Assessment Team's report was 246 Id. at ix-x. 247 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 127 (2008) ("While innocence commissions remain a new and largely untested institutional approach, an investment in such specialist institutions remains entirely justified where generalist appellate and post conviction courts face such difficulties in assessing innocence."). 
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HeinOnline --1 Elon L. Rev. 61 2009 Elon Law Review issued in September 2006, suggesting some resistance to them. 251 But that resistance is probably due less to their perceived cost than to a conviction that the system is good enough as it is, or the belief that, even if reform is needed, it will be politically unpopular precisely because fewer death sentences would result.
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Merely stating these latter reasons for truncating reform suggests how unsatisfactory they are. But for policymakers who remain concerned about the political fallout of endorsing change in the death penalty process, one further economic consideration is offered: the current system is simply too expensive. It is estimated that although capital cases comprise only 3% of all criminal felony filings, they occupy 50% of the Florida Supreme Court's docket. 25 And the cost of a capital case resulting in a death sentence far exceeds the costs associated with a case in which a sentence short of death is sought. 254 As a result, all members of the Assessment Team, including those representing the state, were deeply worried that the expenditure of re- 252 Evidence for the belief that many believe the system works sufficiently well comes from the Florida Commission on Capital Cases which, in implying that the Florida death penalty system is not in trouble, noted that none of the twenty-three exonerees it examined were found "innocent" (not surprisingly, since such a verdict does not exist), and that "[t] he guilt of only four defendants ... was subsequently doubted by the prosecuting office or the Governor and Cabinet members." See FL.COMM'N ON CAPITAL CASES, supra note 7, at 5. (The Commission glossed over the fact that, of the remaining twenty, eight had their charges dismissed, ten were acquitted on retrial, and two pleaded guilty to lesser charges, presumably with the consent of the prosecution). Evidence of the second reason for resistance comes from the experience of the Assessment Team itself. At least four members of the original eleven-member Assessment Team were clearly worried about the political repercussions of a recommendation for a moratorium on the death penalty, and three of these individuals ended up removing themselves from the Team, although at least one of these agreed with all of our recommendations; such actions are understandable but unfortunate. The Death Penalty in Florida sources on capital cases significantly detracts from Florida's ability to renderjustice in non-capital cases. 255 Perhaps the ultimate rationale for correcting as many deficiencies as possible in the death penalty process (and thus reducing the number of capital charges and death sentences) is that the quality of the entire criminal justice system would be improved.
The fact that the death penalty system in Florida manages to soak up a huge proportion of judicial and financial resources yet remains seriously flawed suggests an alternative reform: abolition of the death penalty, or at least a moratorium on its administration while improvements are made. The American Bar Association has adopted the latter position. 256 The Florida Assessment Team could not reach a consensus on the issue, and therefore did not put forward that recommendation. But, as this article has demonstrated, there are numerous reasons for keeping both of the latter options on the table.
